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Greed-the antithesis of grace-
does nothing but create excessive waste.
This world is ready to create space,
to benefit others, to reject profit-driven disgrace.
But when corporations give grace-when this novel transaction take place-
will the world be ready for the global transformation it will create?1
In the current market-based economy, directors all over the
world are questioning whether corporations should exist solely to
maximize shareholder profit.2 Indeed, many for-profit corporations
abide by the neoclassic assumption that in order for a manager to
maximize profit, he must "take the wage demand as a given and
produce its output at the lowest possible cost."3  Capitalism, as
* Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate, 2009; UC Berkeley, B.A. in Cultural
Anthropology and Religious Studies, cum laude, 2004. The author wishes to thank
Heerad Sabeti, and Andrew Kassoy for their insightful comments, Professor Wang
for his guidance, and Todd Johnson for his priceless contribution and meticulous
editing. The author welcomes comments at mickelsa@gmail.com.
1. I wrote this poem after I finished the first draft of this note. May it be an
encouragement to those who desire to do good and do well.
2. See discussion infra Parts II., IV.
3. Daniel T. Ostas, Deconstructing Corporate Social Responsibility: Insights
from Legal and Economic Theory, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 261,285 (2001).
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commonly understood to be the institution holding maximization of
monetary wealth for enterprise owners as the utmost goal, has widely
been criticized as a practice fostering such things as global warming,
human rights abuse and labor violations.4 Many of these claims are
highly debatable, and aspects of profit maximization have certainly
been applied positively to social betterment. However, the fact
remains that much of the business world does not properly account
for environmental and social impacts, as evidenced by rapid
degradation of natural resources and the persistence of global
poverty The suggestion that business can, in fact, be a primary
ground for reversing these types of damages is no longer mere
idealism.6
Indeed, many corporate directors no longer abide by Milton
Friedman's famous declaration that a corporation's only social
responsibility is to provide a profit for its owners Now more than
ever, businesses are refusing to define the highest social good as
trading wealth and prosperity freely and fairly in open markets and
are choosing to hold themselves to a higher standard of care,
enlarging their fiduciary duty to include all stakeholders, including
suppliers, creditors, and the community in which the corporation
resides.8  Social entrepreneurs have realized that profit-driven
businesses consume resources t a rate that cannot be sustained
indefinitely and have adopted a sustainable corporate policy that
attempts to benefit the society in which they reside.9
Will the law allow these public corporations to benefit non-
shareholder constituents? At what amount does corporate
4. Institute for Economic Analysis, Towards the Integration of Economic
Science, available at http://www.iea-macro-economics.org/int-ec-sci-pol.html (last
visited Mar. 17, 2007) ("[I]t has become obvious that continued depletion of
economic resources at the present rate cannot be sustained indefinitely, particularly if
the rest of the world attempts to achieve the present U.S. standard of waste").
5. Id.; see also MUHAMMAD YUNUS, CREATING A WORLD WITHOUT POVERTY 3-
6, 18 (PublicAffairs 2007) [hereinafter "YUNUS, WORLD WITHOUT POVERTY"]
(explaining that the "mainstream free-market-theory suffers from a
'conceptualization failure,' a failure to capture the essence of what it is to be
human."). Yunus further explains that people and businesses are multi-faceted and
that business should not be bound to serve one single, purely profit driven objective.
6. Id.
7. See Milton Friedman, Op-Ed, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM17.
8. See discussion infra Part II.c.
9. See David G. Mandelbaum, Corporate Sustainable Strategies, 26 TEMP. J.
Sci. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 27, 30 (2007).
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philanthropic giving become corporate waste? This note discusses
the emergence of a new corporation known as the For-Benefit
corporation and how publicly owned For-Benefit corporations in the
U.S. and Europe could avoid shareholder derivative suits when other
constituents are served. Although there are few cases addressing the
legal constraints on socially responsible companies, precedent in the
U.S. offers a likely favorable outcome for directors in possible
shareholder derivative suits.
II. Global Corporate Transformation: The Fall of the Wall
Between For-Profit and Non-Profit Corporations
The concept of a compassionate corporation existed long before
the United States of America was formed. In his earlier work, The
Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith speaks of the need for
morality and compassion in both commercial and governmental
affairs.'0 The debate regarding whether a corporation should be
socially responsible began in the U.S. in the 1930s between Professors
Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd." This debate raised the question
of whether corporations owed a duty of "trusteeship" to
constituencies other than shareholders.12 In the end, Berle conceded
that directors are not limited to running a business purely to
maximize profit, but are "in fact and recognized in law as
administrators of a community system."' 3 Yet, state legislators largely
ignored the outcome of this pivotal debate on the nature and purpose
of a corporation until the late eighties when states enacted
constituency statutes, which allow directors to take into consideration
stakeholder interests." Around this same time, companies marketing
themselves as socially responsible' 5 started to emerge, setting the
stage for a movement towards a more compassionate corporation. "
10. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (David D. Rafael & Alec
L. Macfie eds., Liberty Classics 1982) (1759).
11. Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 21 (1992) [hereinafter "Orts, Beyond
Shareholders'1.
12. Id
13. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., FORWARD, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN
SOCIETY ix, xii (Edward S. Mason ed., Harvard University Press 1959).
14. Orts, Beyond Shareholders, supra note 11.
15. The definition of a double bottom line companies is discussed in Part II.a.
16. For a more in-depth discussion on corporate social responsibility, see
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS' LIABILITIES: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND
SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 1-177 (Klaus J.
2009]
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A. Double Bottom Line: The Emergence of Green Business
The influential Business Roundtable'7 describes corporations as
being entities that are "chartered to serve both their shareholders and
society as a whole. 18 Socially responsible corporations became more
visible to the public in the 1980s and 1990s with leading companies
like The Body Shop and Ben & Jerry's. The Social Venture Network
("SVN"), which was formed in 1991 by socially responsible
entrepreneurs, and Business for Social Responsibility ("BSR")
formed in 1992, brought together many of these early pioneers.19
Many people consider Ben & Jerry's as the first "socially
responsible" company by introducing the concept of improving the
environment as a second bottom line.2° Others praise Newman's Own
as a pioneer for establishing itself as a private sector company to
donate all profits and royalties after taxes for educational and
charitable purposes." The notion of a double bottom line reflects the
understanding that a company is not merely created to make a profit,
but should also account for possible deleterious effects on the
environment.22
B. Adding a Third Bottom Line: Corporate Social Responsibility
Despite the novel addition of a second bottom line for measuring
corporate success, the lack of guidelines for properly treating
Hopt & Gunther Teubner eds., 1985). See also David L. Engel, An Approach to
Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979); Christopher D. Stone,
Corporate Social Responsibility.- What It Might Mean, If It Were Really to Matter,
71 IOWA L. REV. 557 (1986).
17. The Business Roundtable is an association of chief executive officers of
leading U.S. companies with $4.5 trillion in annual revenues and more than 10 million
employees. See generally Business Roundtable Home Page, http://www.business
roundtable.org, for more information.
18. See Orts, Beyond Shareholders, supra note 11, (citing The Business
Roundtable, Corporate Governance and The U.S. Competitiveness, 241, 244 (Nov.
1990)).
19. These include Joshua Mailman and Wayne Silby of Threshold Foundation;
Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield, co-founders of Ben & Jerry's; and Jeffrey
Hollender and Steven Fenichell of Seventh Generation.
20. JEFFREY HOLLENDER AND STEVEN FENICHELL, WHAT MATrERS MOST, 12,
(X ed., "publisher" 2004) [hereinafter "WHAT MATTERS MOST"].
21. The Institute for Social Entrepreneurs, Evolution of the Social Enterprise
Industry: A Chronology of Key Events, (2008), http://socialent.org/documents/
EVOLUTIONOFTHESOCIALENTERPRISEINDUSTRY--ACHRONOLOGY
OFKEYEVENTS.pdf
22. WHAT MATTERS MOST, supra note 20.
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employees and subcontractors jeopardized the reputation of green
companies as socially responsible businesses. As a result, in 1994,
John Elkington added a new, third bottom line that focused on
serving "people" in addition to the planet and profit.2' This triple
bottom line business model maintains fair and equitable business
practices toward their employees, the community, and the region in
24
which a corporation conducts business.
As triple bottom line companies were emerging, the term
Corporate Social Responsibility ("CSR") re-entered the corporate
dialogue. CSR in the U.S. is "an ongoing commitment by business to
behave ethically and to contribute to economic development while
demonstrating respect for people, communities, society at large, and
the environment." 
25
CSR attracts an integrated community of global citizens who feel
an innate calling to be environmental stewards and are interested in
sustainable development. The main problem socially responsible
companies face is how to succeed in implementing a heightened
standard of "socially responsible" values without being overburdened
by the financial demands from pragmatic execution of such values. 6
The concept of CSR is now a common term used frequently by
multi-national corporations. European interest in CSR promoted the
European Council in Lisbon 7 in March 2000 during which the
European Council encouraged companies to become more socially
responsible by taking into consideration "lifelong learning, work
23. John Elkington, Towards the Sustainable Corporation: Win-Win-Win
Business Strategies for Sustainable Development, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1994, at
90-100.
24. Darrell Brown, et al., Triple Bottom Line: A Business Metaphor for a Social
Construct, available at http://www.recercat.net/bitstream/2072/2223/1/UABDT06-
2.pdf. For a more detailed analysis, see HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL PRESS ET AL.,
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (2003); TOM
CHAPPELL, THE SOUL OF A BUSINESS: MANAGING FOR PROFIT AND THE COMMON
GOOD (1993); STUART L. HART, CAPITALISM AT THE CROSSROADS: THE UNLIMITED
BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN SOLVING THE WORLD'S MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS
(2007); ANDREW W. SAVITZ & KARL WEBER, THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE: How
TODAY'S BEST-RUN COMPANIES ARE ACHIEVING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS - AND How YOU CAN Too (2006); BOB WILLARD, THE
SUSTAINABILITY ADVANTAGE: SEVEN BUSINESS CASE BENEFITS OF A TRIPLE
BOTrOM LINE (2006).
25. See WHAT MATTERS MOST, supra note 20, at 29 (citing Business: The Ultimate
Resource (2002)).
26. Id at 192.
27. Commission Green Paper on Promoting a European Framework for
Corporate Social Responsibility, at 3, COM (2001) 366 final (July 18, 2001).
2009]
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organization, equal opportunities, social inclusion and sustainable
development." 28 Further, the European Commission recognized that
shareholder value is not achieved merely through maximizing short-
term profits, but also through "market-oriented yet responsible
behavior.
29
In addition, European support of CSR businesses is increasing
exponentially.3 ° On March 13, 2006, the European Commission
("EC") enacted a Resolution entitled, "Corporate Social
Responsibility: A New Partnership., 31 In this resolution, Europe
acknowledged that CSR has become "an increasingly important
concept for competitiveness both globally and within the E.U., and is
part of the debate about globalization, competitiveness and
sustainability., 32 The resolution led to the creation of the European
Alliance for CSR, which recognized that all stakeholders must be
taken into account when making business decisions. 3' This Alliance
operates around three core principles: 1) raising awareness and
improving knowledge on CSR and reporting on its achievements; 2)
helping to mainstream and develop open coalitions of cooperation;
and 3) enabling the environment for CSR.34
The definition of CSR in the U.S. mirrors that in Europe.
According to the European Commission, CSR is "a concept whereby
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their
28. Id
29. Communication from the Commission concerning Corporate Social
Responsibility: A Business Contribution to Sustainable Development, at 5, COM
(2002) 347 final (July 2, 2002), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0347:FIN:EN:PDF.
30. Id; see also supra note 27. In the past decade, numerous reports have been
published on CSR. "The Sustainable Development Strategy for Europe" adopted
during the Goteborg European Council of June 2001 acknowledged that long-term
economic growth, social cohesion, and environmental protection go hand in hand and
encouraged businesses to adopt such policies in their own bylaws. Additionally, the
EU Multi-Stakeholder Forum on CSR (CSR Forum) was formed in 2002, and the
European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ) formed in 2006 which has more
than ten countries. For more information see http://www.corporate-
responsibility.org/C2B/document-tree/ViewACategory.asp?CategorylD=35.
31. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The
Council and the European Economic and Social Committee Implementing the
Partnership for Growth and Jobs Making Europe a Pole of Excellence on Corporate
Social Responsibility, COM (2006) 136 final (March 22, 2006), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0136:FIN:EN:HTML.
32. Id. at 2.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 11.
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business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on
a voluntary basis."35 CSR has three main features in Europe. First, it
is behavior by businesses over and above legal requirements,
voluntarily adopted because businesses deem it to be in their long-
term interest.36 Further, it promotes sustainable development of a
business by integrating the economic, social and environmental
impact of their activities.37 Lastly, CSR is not an optional "add-on" to
business core activities; instead, it represents the way businesses are
managed.38 Although the European and the U.S. definitions are
vague, both embody a conviction that a corporation's existence
should not relate solely to making money for the sake of making
money but that a corporation has a social responsibility to contribute
and improve the community in which it operates.
Muhammad Yunus, the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize recipient,
suggests that socially responsible companies in the U.S. take two basic
forms: weak and strong.39 A "weak" CSR company does no harm to
people or the planet, unless doing so will sacrifice profit."° On the
other hand, "strong" CSR companies seek to benefit people and the
planet in the course of doing business so long as the profit margin is
not lost.41 Yunus rejects the idea that CSR will cause positive change
in business leaders.42 He states that the concept is often misused by
corporate leaders for selfish gain and, as a result, is ineffective.43
Instead of CSR, Yunus advocates for a completely new entity, which
he calls a "social business," a corporation that has an underlying
objective of "creat[ing a] social benefit for those whose lives it
touches ... [as] cause-driven rather than profit-driven, with the
potential to act as a change agent for the world."" Maria Eitel, Nike's
Vice President for Corporate Responsibility, notes that there is no
35. A Business Contribution to Sustainable Development, supra note 29, at 3.
36. Id. at 5.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. YUNUS, WORLD WITHOUT POVERTY, supra note 5, at 15.
40. Id.
41. Id
42. Id. at 16.
43. Id (stating that the philosophy of these companies "seems to be: Make as
much money as you can, even if you exploit the poor to do so-but then donate a tiny
portion of the profits for social causes or create a foundation to do things that will
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perfect factory, just as there is no perfect community, but this should
not hinder the business community from creating a system and a
framework within which these issues can be addressed, and
expressed.45 Eitel's reference to a "system and framework" is exactly
what socially responsible companies need now in order to survive.46
In order to assess and identify businesses that are trying to
position themselves in the vector of Fourth Sector organizations, a
number of different rating systems have been developed.47 One of the
most comprehensive of these rating systems was developed in 2004 by
S-BAR.48 More recently B Lab, a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation,
developed a certification scheme, derived from S-BAR and other
rating systems, which it uses to identify socially responsible for-profit
businesses that it brands as "B corporations."49 In order to be "B
certified," a corporation must score eighty points out of two hundred
on a test to determine whether it meets a set of social and
environmental performance standards. Once the corporation has
passed this initial test, it must institutionalize stakeholder
responsibility by inserting certain language into its corporate bylaws
that allows managers to consider the interests of employees, the
community and the environment, which may, in some cases, require
companies to reincorporate into a state with a constituency statute
45. See WHAT MATTERS MOST, supra note 20, at 201.
46. See generally SIMON ZADEK, THE CIVIL CORPORATION: THE NEW ECONOMY
OF CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP (2001)
47. See OpenSRI, http://www.opensri.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); Oekom
Research AB in Germany, http://oekom.ve.m-online.net/index.php?language=ukd#
home (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); Dow Jones Sustainable Index,
http://www.sustainability-indexes.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); Ethibel,
http://www.ethibel.org/subs-e/4index/main.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2008);
FTSE4Good, http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4GoodIndexSeries/index.jsp (last
visited Sept. 18, 2008); KLD's Domini 400 Social Index, http://www.kld.com/
indexes/ds400index/index.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); Corporate Governance
Quotient (CGQ), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/corporate-governance
_quotient.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); and B Labs in 2007,
http://www.bcorporation.net (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
48. The Sustainable Business Achievement Ratings (S-BAR) was created in 2004
in response to the inability of the California state legislators to agree upon a working
definition of "social business." As a result, a 2004 California bill giving state
procurement preference to "social businesses" was tabled. S-BAR is "the first
comprehensive system with a market-based, broadly applicable, and transparent
means of assessing a company's environmental, economic and social performance."
See http://www.sustainabilityratings.com/about/index.html.
49. "B corporation" is a trademark of B Lab.
50. See http://www.bcorporation.net.
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allowing for such an amendment.5 ' B Lab's founders adopted their
stakeholder accountability approach from Upstream 21, a holding
company which pioneered the idea of incorporating stakeholder
language in the articles of its portfolio companies." Once the
corporation has become a B corporation, it must donate one-tenth of
one percent of its revenue to B Labs.53
C. For-Benefit Corporations: The Emergence of a New Fourth
Sector
Socially responsible businesses and social enterprises in the U.S.
are catalyzing a wave towards a new type of "hybrid" organization.
This movement has been building for decades and is now at a
breaking point when the floodgates are about to burst open.
Businesses today are dedicating more resources than ever to
providing social and environmental benefits. Similarly, government
and social-sector organizations are beginning to emulate for-profit
businesses by adopting earned-income governance models as a way to
acquire the necessary capital to sustain their social mission.5 The
convergence of the mission and methods of these non-profit and for-
profit companies is producing a fourth sector of "hybrid"
organizations, which pursue social purposes while engaging in
business activities. This Fourth Sector is emerging in the U.S. and
abroad, with over twenty different names to describe the activity
within the Fourth Sector. 6 It emulates a new generation of value-
driven consumers and shareholders who are demanding that
corporations benefit their communities. The legal community within
the Fourth Sector must decide what alternative approaches or legal
51. Hannah Clark, A New Kind of Company, Inc. Mag., July 2007, available at
http://www.inc.com/magazine/20070701/priority-a-new-kind-of-company.html
[hereinafter Clark, A New Kind of Company].
52. Id. Upstream 21 was co-founded by Leslie Christian. For more information
see http://www.upstream21.com/
53. Id.
54. Heerad Sabeti, The Emerging Fourth Sector 3 (2008), http://fourthsector.net/
prepdocs/FSExecutiveSummaryDraft.pdf.
55. Id
56. "Fourth Sector" organizations are also referred to as Philanthropicapitalism,
Hybrid organization, Corporate citizenship, Social enterprise, For-Benefit company,
B Corporation, Fourth Sector Organizations, Cooperative corporation, Social
entrepreneurship, Cooperative Societies, Community Interest Corporations (U.K),
Social Business, Empresa, Social economy enterprises, Le cooperative de solidarite,
Societds A finalit6 sociale, Social Cooperatives, Sociedad Laboral, Corporate social
responsibility, Responsablilit6 social de l'entreprise, and Social investment.
20091
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forms might meet the needs of these hybrid social ventures better
than existing structures or whether a new legal form makes sense, and
if so, what it would look like.
The Fourth Sector Network ("FSN"), which pioneered the
concept of a For-Benefit corporation, has conducted a series of
conventions focused on further developing a structure and legal
framework for a new type of "hybrid" organization. The first of these
meetings was held in 2006 at the Aspen Institute. 7 This meeting
convened a group of seasoned lawyers, legal scholars, financial
experts, and social entrepreneurs to discuss the need for new hybrid
legal structures. 8 The idea for a B certification and a new type of
hybrid organization referred to as the L3C materialized during this
meeting. Following this successful meeting, a second meeting was
convened in Boston in April 2007 at a Social Enterprise Alliance
("SEA") conference.6° The most recent convention on establishing
new legal "hybrid" forms was held at NYU Law School on July 17,
2008, bringing together attorneys, investors, funders, scholars, and
entrepreneurs to explore the limits to "hybrid" organizations under
existing law and to examine possible characteristics of new hybrid
forms.6' This convention resulted in the creation of the first ever
"Legal Strategy Group" website that offers all the necessary legal aid
for hybrid organizations. More specifically, the website contains a
legal document library, a tool and resource library, a social enterprise
attorney directory, a discussion forum and a Fourth Sector wiki for
social entrepreneurs and attorneys.
As social entrepreneurs and businesses attempt to surf the wave
towards a Fourth Sector by seamlessly blending a social purpose with
their business agenda, a collaborative effort has begun to develop the
essential characteristics of an archetypal Fourth Sector organization,
also known as a "For-Benefit" corporation.6  For-Benefit
corporations are a new class of organizations that are "driven by a
57. See Thomas J. Billitteri, Mixing Mission and Business: Does Social Enterprise
Need a New Legal Approach? Highlights from an Aspen Institute Roundtable, THE
ASPEN INSTITUTE, (2007), http://www.nonprofitresearch.org/usr doc/New_
LegalForms _ReportFINAL.pdf [hereinafter Billitteri, Mixing Mission and
Business].
58. Id.
59. ld; For more information on L3C, see infra note 169.
60. See http://www.se-alliance.org/about-policy.cfm.
61. The report for the meeting will be distributed in November 2008.
62. Sabeti, The Emerging Fourth Sector, see supra note 54.
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social purpose; they are economically self-sustaining, and they seek to
be socially, ethically, and environmentally responsible., 63  A For-
Benefit corporation represents a new paradigm in organizational
design. At all levels, they aim to link two concepts which are held as
a false dichotomy in other models: private interest and public
benefit.64
Currently, the Fourth Sector community is building consensus
around ten essential characteristics for the For-Benefit corporation.
Some of the characteristics that are being considered include: 1) a
core commitment to a social purpose which is embedded in the
organizational structure, 2) freedom to engage in any legitimate
business activity in pursuit of the social purpose, 3) equitable
distribution of ownership rights and distribution rights among
stakeholders, 4) equitable compensation of employees, investors, and
other stakeholders in proportion to their contributions and risk,
subject to reasonable limitations that protect the ability of the
organization to achieve its mission, 5) commitment to having a net
positive social and environmental impact, 6) commitment to full and
accurate assessment and reporting of social, environmental, and
financial performance, 7) limited liability structure such that the
directors of the organization will not be held personally responsible
for the actions of the organization as long as the directors conduct any
business activity that is consistent with its social purpose and
stakeholder obligations, 8) ability to accept debt and equity
investments as well as tax deductible donations, 9) exemption on
certain business taxes, and 10) lock on assets that prevents them from
being privatized upon terminal events.65
As the Fourth Sector expands, organizations are encountering
limitations imposed by existing legal and tax structures. Social
entrepreneurs and their attorneys do not have a clear understanding
about the existing legal consequences of structuring a For-Benefit
corporation. For-Benefit entrepreneurs have little choice but to
operate within the constraints of the three existing sectors. In the
next section, I discuss the legal consequences of trying to create a
For-Benefit corporation under existing law as it relates to the
fiduciary duties of For-Benefit directors.
63. See generallyhttp://www.fourthsector.net/for-benefit-organizations.php.
64. Id.
65. Sabeti, The Emerging Fourth Sector, supra note 54.
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III. Shifting from Shareholder to Stakeholder: The
Consequences of Being Generous in a Market-Based
Economy in the U.S. and Abroad
A For-Benefit corporation seeks to benefit not only its
shareholders, but also its stakeholders, creating a risk that directors
could be held liable for breaching their fiduciary duty to maximize
shareholder profit in favor of benefiting another corporate
stakeholder. Such risk is reduced with For-Benefit corporation
directors who look to the state constituency statute as support for
decisions made in the interest of nonshareholder constituencies.66
Scholars claim that a corporate manager's only objectives are to
sustain monetary growth for the company and to increase company
and shareholder value.67 This obligation stems from the commonly-
held belief that the sole interest of a shareholder is to maximize profit
and thus, a director must maximize the value of corporate shares to
fulfill his fiduciary duty to the shareholder. Under this current legal
framework, For-Benefit corporations are significantly limited in the
scope of their activity. For example, For-Benefit corporations seek to
maximize benefit to all stakeholders and donate one hundred percent
of their economic profits towards advancing their social purpose. So,
must we assume that all publicly held For-Benefit corporations will be
subject to shareholder derivative suits for breaching their fiduciary
duty?
More importantly, what obligations will For-Benefit directors
have towards their shareholders? In this section, I clarify that a
director's fiduciary duty does not always involve maximizing
shareholder profit. Additionally, the protection of the business
judgment rule protects directors in most cases involving the
shareholder primacy doctrine. For-Benefit corporations should not
be liable for day-to-day business decisions made in the interest of
stakeholders as long as the directors are disinterested and
independent, and make decisions in a reasonable manner.
66. See discussion infra Part III.a.iv.
67. YUNUS, WORLD WITHOUT POVERTY, supra note 5, at 16., see also notes 82-
84, infra.
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A. Standard of Conduct and Fiduciary Duties in the US.
I The Business Judgment Rule
When making day-to-day decisions, courts apply the business
judgment rule absent bad faith, or self-dealing, to determine whether
a director has violated his duty to uphold the best interests of the
corporation.68 Generally, the business judgment rule protects most
lawful disinterested and independent actions of a board of directors
provided they were taken in the honest belief that the action was in
the best interests of the company, after a reasonable deliberative
process.69 Under this standard, there is the "presumption that in
making business decisions the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that action
taken was in best interest of the company."7 ° Because the court
presumes valid business purpose, the burden of proof is on the
shareholder to show otherwise.71 When a court decides that a
director's decision was a valid exercise of business judgment, the
decision is almost always upheld as long as the court can attribute a
rational business purpose for such a decision.72
A shareholder may overcome this presumption by showing a
violation of his duty of care or duty of loyalty in connection with a
deliberate decision averse to the economic interests of the
shareholder.73 Such a breach is manifest when the board "acts
intentionally, in bad faith, or for personal gain."74 A director acts in
bad faith when "the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other
than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation ...
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties."75 Only when the
presumption is overcome does the burden of proof shift to the
director to prove that his decision was entirely fair to the interests of
68. Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 357 (Del. Ch. 2007) (citing Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
69. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (explaining that a
court "under such circumstances will not substitute its own notions of what is or is not
sound business judgment").
70. Id.; see also Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30(a) (2005).
71. Id,
72. Id.; see also ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance § 4.01(c).
73. See Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d at 357.
74. Id. (citing Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1093-97 (Del. 2001)).
75. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del.
2006) (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)).
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the corporation.76
Delaware law contains very few bright-line rules governing the
relationship between directors and shareholders." However, in the
non-takeover context, directors may favor non-shareholder
constituencies as long as it does not have a significant impact on
shareholders.78 Jurisprudence seems to suggest that the court will be
especially deferential when directors claim to have altruistic purposes
that benefit the company in the long run because of the possibility
that shareholders will eventually receive a higher return on their
investment.79 The court's rationale for refusing to apply the business
judgment rule is premised on the belief that shareholders must be
protected from self-interested directors.' Thus, when a director is
focused on benefiting others, the court will be less likely to find a self-
interested motive. Additionally, when a For-Benefit corporation
establishes non-shareholder constituencies as an essential objective of
the corporation, either through stating it in their articles of
incorporation or its bylaws, the court may find that the director was
acting in the best interests of the corporation, despite the disregard
for shareholder interest. Further, if the identity of the corporation is
based on distinguishing itself in the market as a value-driven
corporation, it may be detrimental to the economic prosperity and
76. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755-58 (Del.
Ch. 2005); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (De. 1993); see In
re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755-58 (Del. 2005); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (citing Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d
1366, 1376 (Del. 1993); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279
(Del. 1988); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,710 (Del. 1983)).
77. In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S'holder Litig., No. 1106-CC, 2007 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 120, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2007).
78. Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers: Bridging the
Unocal/Revlon Gap, 35 Ariz. L. Rev. 989, 996 (1993) [hereinafter "Ragazzo,
Unifying the Law'.
79. The GRI Register, BP, Making Energy More - The Sustainability Report
2005 1 (2005),
http://www.corporateregister.com/search/report.cgi?num=15081&com=O (asserting,
in the BP Sustainability Report, that taking steps to improve sustainability directly
enable businesses to prosper economically); see also David G. Mandelbaum,
Corporate Sustainable Strategies, 26 TEMP. J. ScI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 27, 32 (2007);
see also Goldman's Sachs Group Inc., GS Sustain Report (2007),
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/summit2007/gs-esgembargoed-untilO30707pd
f.pdf (showing that socially responsible companies can generate high stock prices,
outperforming the general stock market by twenty-five percent and have a
competitive advantage over their peers.)
80. See Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 720; see also ALI, Principles of Corporate
Governance § 4.01(c).
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thus shareholder value, if the corporation sacrifices such value for
monetary gain.
ii. Unocal's heightened standard of review: exceptions to the
business judgment rule8'
Even under a heightened Unocal standard of review, Delaware
case law tends to uphold decisions in favor of non-shareholder
constituencies.' In the context of a hostile takeover or a change of
control situation, courts apply a heightened Unocal standard of
review 3 under the rationale that managers have a higher tendency
toward personal entrenchment at the expense of the shareholders'
interests in a takeover or merger.84 Under this standard, the court will
give directors the benefit of the business judgment rule only if they
can first demonstrate that they had "reasonable grounds for believing
a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed" and the
defensive measure was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed.,
85
In Unocal, the court explained that a "reasonable" decision for a
defensive measure is "an element of balance" between, inter alia, the
impact of non-shareholder constituencies, the effect on shareholder
value, and the effect on the corporation. 86  The balancing test is
supported by case law in Delaware and several other states."
81. Although the Unocal standard originated in Delaware, twenty-eight states
have adopted essentially the same Unocal standard principle in their statutes; see
Shani Fuller, COMMENT Shareholders, Directors, and Other Constituencies:
Who's on First in Oregon Corporate Takeover Law?, 30 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 347,
359 (1994) [hereinafter Fuller, TakeoverLa].
82. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law, supra note 78, at 996.
83. Golden Cycle, LLC v. Allan, No. CIV.A. 16301, 1998 WL 892631 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 10, 1998) (mem.); see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
955 (Del. 1985); see also Wells M. Engledow, Structuring Corporate Board Action to
Meet the Ever-Decreasing Scope of Revlon Duties, 63 ALB. L. REV. 505, 509 (1999)
[hereinafter Engledow, Scope of Duties].
84. Craig W. Palm & Mark A. Kearney, A Primer on the Basics of Directors'
Duties in Delaware: The Rules of the Game (Part II), 42 VILL. L. REv. 1043, 1066
(1997); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the
Vertical Dimension of Global Corporate Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1133,
1160 (1999) (stating that even when Revlon applies, Delaware still permits corporate
boards wide leeway to act); see also Engledow, Scope of Duties, supra note 83, at
531.
85. Unocal Corp., 493 at 955.
86. Id; see also Fuller, Takeover Law, supra note 81, at 360.
87. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984,
1015 (E.D. Wis.), affd onother grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 955 (1989) (upholding defensive tactics because, inter alia, the pending bid
posed "a danger to a corporation's [nonshareholder] constituencies (customers,
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For-Benefit corporations that make decisions to uphold the
socially-conscious culture of the corporation will be more likely to
succeed in shareholder derivative suits than those corporations who
fail to establish a connection between their decision and the social
purpose of the corporationY. Indeed, Delaware case law
demonstrates a strong deference when directors make decisions to
maintain corporate value despite a change in management situation. 9
In Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., Time spent two years
researching a possible merger opportunity with an entertainment
company that would uphold its own values.Y When the merger deal
was almost completed with Warner, Paramount offered Time an all-
cash offer for all outstanding shares at $175 per share. 9  Time
persistently refused Paramount's offer even when the bid rose to $200
per share asserting that the Warner transaction had greater long-term
value and, unlike Paramount, would not threaten the "culture" of
Time9 The court found that the directors' actions were justified
because "directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately
conceived corporate plan for short-term shareholder profit unless
there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy."'93 Similarly,
socially responsible companies who have created a culture and
deliberate strategy of balancing a duty to all stakeholders are more
likely to win the court's presumption that they are not in violation of
their fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder profit.
iii Maximizing shareholder profit: Re vlon's strict standard of
re vie W
Scholars claim that in order to uphold corporate philosophy, a
suppliers, employees)"); GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016,
1019-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (upholding defensive measures on the grounds that "[a]
corporation with a perceived threat of dismemberment of large divisions of the
enterprise, employing thousands of employees, owes substantial regard for their
pension benefits, and in the case of loyal management, severance benefits"); see also
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985).
88. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (1990) (holding
that a target company's board does not have to make any financial comparisons to
justify defensive action); see also Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964)
(regarding directors' defense against hostile takeover that would be harmful to
employees).
89. Id
90. Paramount Commc'ns., 571 A.2d at 1144.
91. Id at 1147-49.
92. Id. at 1149.
93. Id at 1154 (citing Revlon, 506 A.2d 173).
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public company must maximize short-term shareholder profits.94
Commentators cite Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.95 as the fountainhead of
the corporate law rule that the objective of directors must only be to
make profits for shareholders. 96  Although the court in Dodge
precluded a business decision made in the interest of non-shareholder
interests, Dodge is no longer applied as such.7' Instead, federal and
state case law reference Dodge as evidence of the broad discretion a
director has in business decisions.98
Nevertheless, under the Revlon duties, a director has a duty to
maximize shareholder value in certain circumstances. The Supreme
Court of Delaware states that the Revlon duties are generally
triggered "when a corporation initiates an active bidding process
seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a
clear breakup of the company,"9 or "where a target abandons its
long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the
breakup of the company;"' ° According to Revlon, once the board of
directors is no longer defending the company from takeover, it must
sell to the highest bidder or implement routine defensive strategy to
enable the board to negotiate for a higher bid." ' The court in Revlon
suggests that a board of directors may no longer take non-shareholder
constituency interests into account when deciding which bid to
accept; '°2 however, Revlon still "permits consideration of other
94. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 230
(1990). See also Dorman L. Commons, Tender Offer. The Sneak Attack in
Corporate Takeovers 139 (1985); Kathleen Conn, For-Profit School Management
Corporations: Serving The Wrong Master, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 129, 132 (2002).
95. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459 (Mich. 1919).
96. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Symposium: Corporations Theory and Corporate
Governance Law: Getting Real About Corporate Social Responsibility A Reply to
Professor Greenfield, 35 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 645, 648 (2002); see also D. Gordon
Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 277, 315 (1998).
97. Theodoro Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 402 (Del. Ch. 1969);
see also Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 179 (1968); Commodity Futures
Trading Comv. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985); Lytle v. Malady, 566 N.W.2d
582, 594 (Mich. 1997); In re Estate of Butterfield, 341 N.W.2d 453, 459 (Mich. 1983);
Reed v. Burton, 73 N.W.2d 333,336 (Mich. 1955).
98. Id.
99. Paramount Commc'ns., 571 A.2d at 1150 (citing Mills Acquisition Co. v.
Macmillan, Inc, 559 A.2d 1261 (1988).
100. Id.. (citing Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986).
101. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
102. See Ragazzo, Unifying the Law, supra note 78 at 989; see also Lawrence E.
Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate
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constituencies so long as it is "rationally related [to] benefit[s]
accruing to the stockholders."'0 3 Moreover, modern case law has
significantly narrowed the scope of an enhanced duty to maximize
profits under the Revlon standard so that a company is certain to
trigger Revlon only in the context of a sale of the entire company.14
iv. Business decisions made in the interests of US. stakeholders:
A hypothetical case study
The cases upholding a defensive action under the stricter Unocal
standard based on threats to non-shareholder constituencies are
difficult to evaluate because each of these cases also involved a threat
to shareholders.' Although the courts have allowed directors to
refuse bids that threatened non-shareholder constituencies, it is
impossible to determine whether the court upheld this decision based
on the threats to shareholders, non-shareholders, or both.
16
Essentially, fiduciary duties were created with the primary
purpose of redressing the imbalance of power between the fiduciary
and the shareholder.'w This relationship, taken to the extreme is
fairly predictable. According to Delaware case law, if a For-Benefit
corporation director shut down an unprofitable manufacturing plant
immediately, thereby maximizing short-term profit for shareholders,
no cause of action would exist against a director for violation of
fiduciary duty because the director upheld the shareholder's interest.
On the other extreme, if a director left the same manufacturing plant
open indefinitely in order to uphold the employees' interest to keep
their job, shareholders would have a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty and possible corporate waste because shareholders
Constituency Statutes,70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 609 (1992) [hereinafter "Mitchell,
Enforcing Constituency Statutes'1.
103. Revlon. 506 A.2d 173 at 182. See generally, Lawrence A. Cunningham &
Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: A
Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 Bus. LAW. 1593 (1994).
104. See Ragazzo, Uniong the Law, supra note 78 at 1004-1009 (explaining that a
company is certain to trigger the Revlon standard only when there has been a
complete sale of the entire company. "The possibility that a sale of control triggers
Revlon remains extant but is called into question by Paramount ... [c]hanges of
control may not, and substantial restructurings do not, trigger enhanced Revlon
duties because the corporation continues as an entity.").
105. See Ragazzo, Uni~dng the Law, supra note 78, at 997.
106. Id.
107. See Mitchell, Enforcing Constituency Statutes, supra note 102, at 598;
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1675, 1684-88 (1990).
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have a financial stake in the corporation and a legally mandated
fiduciary relationship with the directors. Therefore, decisions made
in favor of stakeholders at the expense of shareholders will most
likely be a violation of a director's fiduciary duty.
Delaware case law becomes highly unpredictable in the middle
of the two aforementioned extremes. How does a director balance
preservation of capital, including a fiduciary duty to shareholders with
pursuit of a social purpose to benefit stakeholders? The current U.S.
legal system has answered this question by building a wall between
the profit and public interest. Essentially, a company must choose
between either pursuing a lawful business purpose to maximize profit,
thereby attracting investors and shareholders, or pursuing a
charitable purpose, which requires preclusion of all private
inurement, thereby excluding the possibility for attracting the
necessary capital to be successful.
Assuming, arguendo, a For-Benefit corporation director is faced
with the decision to either shut down an unprofitable manufacturing
plant immediately to maximize shareholder profit, or keep it open for
six months, so that employees, and non-shareholders have enough
time to find a job, would the court uphold the director's decision? 8
Delaware jurisprudence suggests courts will apply a balancing test,
taking into consideration both the interests of shareholders and non-
shareholders. Applying the probable balancing test to this
hypothetical, a court is likely to uphold such a decision absent implicit
self-interest motive and weigh the balance in favor of the directors'
decision. Although directors may take into account non-shareholder
constituencies, stakeholders lack a legal fiduciary relationship with
the corporation under existing law. Accordingly, the court will not
allow directors to preference stakeholder interests at the complete
disregard of those of a shareholder. Nevertheless, the court will be
more willing to favor a decision involving both shareholder and
stakeholder interests when the For-Benefit corporation inserts a
provision allowing stakeholder bias into the articles of incorporation
or the corporate bylaws.
108. For the purposes of this hypothetical, I will assume that Delaware law will
govern considering the novel use of constituency statutes by For-Benefit
corporations.
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v. Constituency Statutes.- Reinforcing Business Decisions in
Favor of Stakeholders
The balancing scale will swing back in favor of the socially
responsible director when he looks to constituency state statutes to
preference stakeholder interests over shareholder interests.
Constituency statutes vary from state to state: some inevitably
overrode the Unocalor Revlon standards,' while others simply offer
the option for directors to look to stakeholder interests in certain
contexts."0 Although states enacted constituency statutes primarily to
give directors another defensive tactic following the explosion of
takeovers in the late 1980's, these statutes may also allow directors to
consider stakeholder interests when making day-to-day decisions. "'
In effect, constituency statutes codify the right of a director to
consider the best interests of the corporation as a whole."12 Indeed,
more than half of the states have enacted constituency statutes''3
109. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715 (1991).
110. See e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101B (West 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
271B.12-210(4) (LexisNexis 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4(1) (2008); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-103-202, -204 (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a)(3) (2007).
111. Carol B. Swanson, The Turn in Takeovers: A Study in Public Appeasement
and Unstoppable Capitalism, 30 GA. L. REV. 943, 974 (1996); see also Ragazzo,
Unifying the Law, supra note 78, at 1023 (describing general corporate law and
legitimacy of considering interests of non-shareholder constituencies).
112. See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation,
Relationship Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78
MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1462 (1994) ("The viability of the shareholder primacy theory
derives from economic theory; it says that shareholders' unfettered pursuit of
maximum profits promotes economic efficiency...."). See also Richard A. Posner,
The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA. L. REV. 487, 491-97 (1980) (defending wealth
maximization). See also Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Constituency Statutes: A
Dialectical Interpretation, 15 J.L. & COM. 257, 261-62 (1995) (describing corporate
constituency statutes).
113. Thirty-one states have enacted non-shareholder constituency statutes. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756 (2008); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (West 2008);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-221 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1602, -1702 (2008); 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (West 2008); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 491.101B (West 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4)
(LexisNexis 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G)(2) (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13-C, § 831 (2008); MD. CODE. ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS. § 2-104(b)(9) (West
2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West 2008); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-
8.30(d) (West 2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (West 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:6-1(2), :6-14(4) (West 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (West 2008); N.Y.
BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6)
(2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5)
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allowing directors to take into consideration the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies, which normally include employees,
consumers, suppliers, and the local community."' In many states, this
standard arguably has become the accepted model of corporate
governance for public corporations."'
Courts have not yet provided an analysis of the legality or
constitutionality of constituency statutes, or even an explanation of
how they should be implemented."6  Nevertheless, some cases
reference constituency statutes as a valid reason for looking to long-
term non-shareholder interests instead of short-term shareholder
interests in making certain business decisions."'
(2007); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) (2008); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4(1) (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-202, -204 (2008); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a)(3) (2007); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 2008);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(e) (2008).
114. Rima Fawal Hartman, Situation-Specific Fiduciary Duties for Corporate
Directors. Enforceable Obligations or Toothless Ideals?, 50 WASH & LEE L. REV.
1761, 1765 (1993) (stating that constituency statutes as well as Delaware case law
indicates that directors should be allowed to consider the concerns of all stakeholders
and in certain situations requires the board to consider certain stakeholders' concerns
under certain circumstances).
115. Brian S. Cohen, Corporate Governance for the Entrepreneur, 71 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 125, 125-130 (1997).
116. Lynda J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders.- Evaluating Corporate
Constituency Statutes Under the Takings Clause, 24 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 7 (1997)
[hereinafter Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders].
117. See Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1986)
(stating that Pennsylvania law requires a director to oppose a tender offer that is
harmful to the corporation's long-term interests, even at the expense of short-term
shareholder interests); Thompson v. Central Ohio Cellular, 639 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio
1994) (stating that directors "must" consider interests of shareholders and "may"
consider interests of creditors); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great Northern Nekoosa
Corp., 727 F. Supp. 31 (D. Me. 1989) (stating that Main law "suggests" that the
Directors of a corporation, in considering the best interests of the shareholders and
corporation, should also consider the interests of the company's employees, its
customers and suppliers, and communities in which offices of the corporation are
located); Murray v. Conseco, Inc., 795 N.E.2d 454 (Ind. 2003) (citing constituency
statute to state the rule that the director's decision was valid because it was made in
the interest of the corporation as a whole to remove a director that the shareholders
had voted in); Keyser v. Commonwealth National Financial Corp., 675 F.Supp. 238,
241 (M.D. Pa. 1987) ("[T]he Board could consider so-called social issues in evaluating
merger proposals."). For a more in-depth discussion of the acknowledgment that
non-shareholder interests should be considered an essential component to a
director's decision, see also Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder
Primacy: A Proposed Corporate Regime that Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests,
30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587, 613-14 (1997). See also Andrew Keay, Tackling
the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom's
'Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach', 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 577, 596 (2007)
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Commentators assert that "the legal effect of such [constituency]
laws may be to insulate officers and directors from liability for failing
to maximize profits to shareholders.....8 While constituency statutes
may be useful in rejecting shareholder primacy, these statutes are
limited in application. Most constituency statutes limit the definition
of stakeholder constituents to include customers, suppliers,
employees, creditors or the community around which a company's
office is located. This narrow definition does not include the
international community, environmental concerns or broader human
rights concerns."9 Consequently, decisions made in the interest of the
broader local community are considerably risky in nature but they are
one step in the right direction.
B. European Fiduciary Duties and Corporate Governance
The shareholder primacy doctrine is considered by many scholars
as a purely Anglo-American concept."' In fact, most industrialized
countries besides the U.S. and Great Britain have a stakeholder
model integrated into their corporate governance model.12' The
reason why the stakeholder movement is of little concern in non-U.S.
countries is because of a lack of the shareholder primacy doctrine, the
rarity of shareholder derivative suits, and the lack of hostile
takeovers. 22 "In a non-U.S. environment, the director may be more
concerned with the effect of a decision on employees or the local
[hereinafter Keay, Tackling the Issue].
118. Mitchell, Enforcing Constituency Statutes supra note 102, at 579.
119. California is one of the only states that is attempting to incorporate an
interest in the environment into its constituency statute with Assembly Bill 2944. As
of August 29, 2008, AB 2944 passed both the California Assembly and Senate and is
pending approval by the Governor. See http://www.statesurge.com/bills/50524-
ab2944-california (last visited Sept. 22, 2008).
120. Mark J. Loewenstein, What Can We Learn from Foreign Systems?.
Stakeholder Protection in Germany and Japan, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1673, 1674 (2002).
121. Id; see also Keay, Tackling the Issue, supra note 117, at 578 ("directors are
not only to manage the company for the betterment of shareholders, but also in the
interests of a multitude of stakeholders (including the shareholders)"); Roberta S.
Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1156, 1171
(1993) (the non-anglo-saxon stakeholder model is "premised on the theory that
groups in addition to shareholders have claims on a corporation's assets and earnings
because those groups contribute to a corporation's capital.").
122. Loewenstein, Stakeholder Protection, supra note 120, at 1680-82 (explaining
that Germany has relatively few hostile takeovers as compared to the United States
and Great Britain. Further, shareholder derivative suits are unknown to German
companies.).
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economy than would a U.S. director. 1 23  Accordingly, there is no
need to enact constituency statutes because the stakeholder doctrine
is already embedded within the corporate governance.
One example of such stakeholder model is found in Germany.
Germany's stakeholder corporate governance doctrine emerged with
the aid of the Reform Act of 1870 ("German Reform Act").' The
German Reform Act created the Aufsichtsrat, an intermediary
outside board between Vorstand, the management team.125  The
Aufsichtsrat was created in order to take into account stakeholder
interests including the "investors, workers, the state, and others.'
12 6
After World War II, the government reaffirmed the importance of
stakeholder interests by enacting the Codetermination Act of 1976,
which requires "all stock corporations, Actiengesellschaft (AG), and
all other business entities over a certain employee base, to have a
two-tiered board structure that includes significant employee
representation on the supervisory Aufsichtsrat board. 127 Arguably,
the Aufsichtsrat board oversees the Vorstand board to the same
degree that a board of directors oversees corporate officers in a
company based in the U.S.'28 Having a board made up of non-
shareholder constituencies creates the implicit assumption that non-
shareholder interests must also be upheld when making business
decisions.
Moreover, U.K. corporations are now moving towards a more
stakeholder centered model of governance.2 9 The recent enactment
of The Companies Act of 2006 ("British Companies Act")
incorporates a provision that is consistent with the American version
of a constituency statute.'30 Section 172(1) of the British Companies
Act allows directors to take into consideration the long-term interests
123. Id. at 1674.
124. Id. at 1675.
125. Id
126. Id at 1675.
127. Id. at 1676-77.
128. Id at 1677. ("For entities that have between 500 and 2000 employees, one-
third of the supervisory Aufsichtsratboard must consist of employee representatives.
For entities with 2000 or more employees, one-half of the supervisory Aufsichtsrat
board must be employee representatives, and some of these must be representatives
of the unions. Typically, if the company has more than 20,000 workers, the
Aufsichtsrat board consists of twenty members, of which ten represent the
shareholders, seven the workers, and three the unions.").
129. Keay, Tackling the Issue, supra note 117, at 588-95.
130. Id. at 594-95.
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of the corporation, including those affecting the company's
employees, suppliers, customers, the community and the
environment. According to the Commission, European businesses
should "provide products and services that add value for society and
deploy entrepreneurial spirit and creativity towards value and
employment creation.
31
Indeed there is a global trend towards the adoption of a more
stakeholder-centered corporate governance model. 13 ' Even Asian
countries are turning away from the shareholder maximization
doctrine. 33 The global market in which American companies operate
is recognizing the importance of taking stakeholder interests into
account in their corporate governance. As such, businesses in the
U.S. that do not adopt a stakeholder governance model risk losing
profit on cross-border ventures.
IV. Liability for Decisions Involving Large Charitable
Donations
One way a For-Benefit corporation benefits stakeholders is
apportionment of a considerably large percentage of profit to
charitable causes. Consequently, For-Benefit corporations may face
shareholder derivative suits for corporate waste if a court finds that
such donations are unreasonable. '34 To date, the court has never
found a corporate charitable donation to be wasteful; however, this
does not preclude future adjudication against corporations for
131. See supra note 31, at 3.
132. Id (Europe urged directors to take all stakeholders into account, declaring
that "Europe does not need just business but socially responsible business that takes
its share of responsibility for the state of European affairs."). Additionally, many
European countries have already enacted the equivalent of a For-Benefit corporation
including the Sociedad Laboral in Spain, Society for Social Purpose in Belgium,
Social Cooperatives in Italy, and the Social Solidarity Cooperatives in Portugal.
133. The Social enterprise in South Korea, enacted by the 2007 Act on Social
Enterprise Promotion, the Seed Money project launched by the Social Welfare
Department in 2001 in Hong Kong, the New Labor Contract Law of 2008 in China,
the Singapore Compact for Corporate Social Responsibility launched by National
Tripartite Initiative in 2004, the Singapore Companies Act of 2004, and the Council
for Better Corporate Citizenship launched in 2002 in Japan.
134. See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991); Theodora Holding Corp. v.
Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969); Sullivan v. Hammer, No. CIV.A.10823,
1990 WL 114223 (Del. Ch. Aug. 14, 1990); see also Faith Kahn, Pandora's Box:
Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 579, 606 (1997) [hereinafter Kahn, Pandora's BoA].
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excessive charitable giving. 3'
When a public For-Benefit corporation donates an exceptional
percentage of their profit to a charitable cause, the court will apply
the reasonableness standard of review. '1 6 What is reasonable is a
factual inquiry. Further, the court has never dealt with cases
involving donations larger than 10 percent of corporate profit.'37 In
Theodora Holding Corp. v. Hendersen, the court found that a
donation of 2.7 percent of the corporation's annual gross income was
reasonable, explaining that the donation was less than the 5 percent
limit for federal tax deductions of charitable donations.' In Kahn v.
Sullivan, the Court of Chancery found support in the Delaware
statute and the Internal Revenue Code to uphold a corporate
decision to donate $85 million to a museum.13 9 The Court found that
state legislation has placed no limitation on the size of the gift, and
the donation did not exceed the 10 percent deduction limitation of
the Internal Revenue Code.4 0  Accordingly, 10 percent of a
company's taxable income for the year 4' has been considered to be
the appropriate threshold for reasonableness.
142
Despite the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") limitation, it is
unlikely that ten percent is the limitation for what a court will allow a
For-Benefit corporation to donate. Although state courts have never
had to adjudicate cases involving a donation larger than ten percent
of corporate profits, both Kahn and Theodora looked to the IRS
limitation as only one factor to consider among many in determining
whether the donation was reasonable. The court intimates that a
135. Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d at 404; see also Kahn, 594
A.2d at 61 ("The Court of Chancery recognized that not every charitable gift
constitutes a valid corporate action.").
136. Kahn, Pandora's Box, supra note 134, at 606 ("The standard of
reasonableness was also endorsed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn v.
Sullivan, and it appears, to date, to be the authoritative standard.").
137. Id
138. Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d at 405.
139. Kahn, 594 A.2d at 61. Kahn is the only litigation involving a shareholder
challenge to a corporate contribution by a public corporation. See Faith Kahn,
Symposium: Corporate Philanthropy." Law, Culture, Education, and Politics. Article:
Legislatures, Courts and the SEC. Reflections on Silence and Power in Corporate
and Securities Law, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1107, 1124 (1997) [hereinafter Kahn,
Corporate Philanthropyi.
140. Id.
141. 26 U.S.C. 170(b)(2)(2005).
142. See Kahn, Corporate Philanthropy, supra note 139, at 1130-31.
143. Kahn, 594 A.2d at 61 (taking into consideration the percentage of income, as
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"relatively small loss of immediate income.., is far out-weighed by
the overall benefits flowing from the placing of such gifts in channels
where they serve to benefit those in need of philanthropic or
educational support, thus providing justification for large private
holdings, thereby benefiting [shareholders] in the long run."'"
Moreover, commentators interpret Theodora as requiring directors to
show that donating funds must be reasonable in "amount and
purpose," serving both the long-term interest of the shareholders and
the corporation."' Therefore, if a corporation can show that the
donation is congruent with the corporation's purpose and interests, it
is highly probable that a court will overlook the fact that the donation
exceeds the ten percent IRS limitation.
Additionally, a closer analysis of the language used in Kahn and
Theodora demonstrates that directors and managers are not agents of
shareholders when directing proceeds toward charitable donations.
Therefore, their decisions are presumed to be made in the interests of
the shareholders. 46 "Managers are agents of the corporation itself,
and directors are sui generis... there is no explicit legally enforceable
agency contract between shareholders and directors." ''  No
consideration exists in the exchange between a director and a
shareholder and thus is significantly distinguishable from a
contractual relationship. Indeed, this relationship is more analogous
to the relationship between a trustee and a trustor whereby the
shareholder as a beneficiary financially invests broad discretion in the
director. Appropriately, when a For-Benefit corporation inserts a
well as the benefit to the corporation, finding that "the net worth of Occidental, its
annual net income before taxes, and the tax benefits to Occidental" in concluding
that the gift to the Museum was within "the range of reasonableness" established in
Theodora).
144. Theodora Holding Corp., 257 A.2d at 405.
145. See Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders, supra note 116, at 6 ("Although
corporate law doctrine does permit corporations to use some corporate assets for
charitable and other non-profit-related purposes, these eleemosynary acts are usually
tempered by a requirement that they be in the best long-range interest of the
corporation and thus in the best long-range interest of the shareholders."); see, e.g.,
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); see also David S. Ruder,
Public Obligations of Private Corporations, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 209 (1965); see also
Kahn, Corporate Philanthropy, supra note 142.
146. Margaret M. Blair, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate Philanthropy, 28
STETSON L. REV. 27, 34 (1998).
147. Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Symposium: Why they give at the
office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory
of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1213 (1999).
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provision in its articles of incorporation that explicitly declares its
intent to benefit stakeholders and the community, the investor has a
choice of whether to accept the terms before financial investment.
V. Fumbling into Possibility: Amending the Corporate Code
in Europe and the U.S. to Accommodate a More
Conscious Economy
A. Corporate Code Amendment in the U.S.
A 2000 Business Week/Harris poll asked Americans which of the
following statements did they support: 1) corporations should have
only one purpose, to make the most profit for their shareholders, and
the pursuit of that goal will be best for America in the long run, or 2)
corporations should sometimes sacrifice some profit for the sake of
making things better for their workers and communities in which they
operate?"8 Ninety-five percent of Americans chose the secondproposition.19 Further, according to the Research Collaborative
Initiative ("RCI"), a report that surveyed 108 countries covering over
96 percent of the global GDP, the U.S. is far behind in its efforts to
promote responsible business practices. Indeed, if the majority of
consumers prefer social businesses over purely profit-driven
corporations, what options are available to eliminate the shareholder
primacy doctrine?
Robert Hinkley, a corporate securities attorney, claims that one
way to eliminate shareholder primacy is to amend the corporate code
in every jurisdiction.' According to Hinkley, under the current
corporate code, "corporations are established for one purpose - to
make money for shareholders." '52  Consequently, under Hinkley's
"Code for Corporate Citizenship Amendment" ("Hinkley
148. Robert Hinkley, 28 Words to Redefine Corporate Duties: The Proposal for a
Code for Corporate Citizenship, available at http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/
mm2002/02july-aug/july-aug02corp4.html.
149. Id.
150. The RCI report listed the U.S. as #18 on a list, just above Japan and China
following France and Singapore.
151. Hinkley, Redesigning Corporate Law Business Ethics, available at
http://www.mailarchive.com/sustainablelorgbiofuel@sustainablelists.org/ msg32019.
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Amendment"), a director will still have a duty to make money for
shareholders "but not at the expense of the environment, human
rights, the public safety, the communities in which the corporation
operates or the dignity of its employees."53 Hinkley's Amendment
adds additional constituencies to the constituency statutes and the
requirement for constituency interests to trump those of the
shareholders."' After more than seven years of advocacy, California
and Minnesota attempted to enact legislation to incorporate
Hinkley's Amendment but to no avail."'
Although the Hinkley Amendment is a promising solution to the
problem of shareholder primacy, its application renders the
amendment useless, adding an additional barrier for For-Benefit
corporations. For example, a 2004 California Assembly bill which
would preclude directors from making decisions that will cause
deleterious effects on, inter alia, the environment, human rights, and
public health and safety,'56 was tabled. A new bill was proposed in
2008 that would allow directors to take stakeholder interests and the
environment into consideration when making business decisions. "7
After the bill was approved by both the Assembly and Senate, it was
rejected by the governor on September 30, 2008, because it allowed
directors to consider factors other than the strict financial interest of
corporate shareholders.5"  Although Governor Schwarzenegger
condoned strict adherence to the shareholder primacy doctrine, he
also urged the California legislature to consider and study
153. Robert Hinkley, 28 Words to Redefine Corporate Duties.- The Proposal for a
Code for Corporate Citizenship, available at http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/
mm2002/02july-aug/july-aug02corp4.html; see also Ron James, President Bush's
Economic Reform (2002), available at http://www.c4cr.org/ethicalbiz.html; Gili
Chupak, The Code for Corporate Responsibility: Widening the Perspective of
Management (2004), available at http://www.c4cr.org/paper01.html.
154. Id
155. California Senate Bill (SB) 917, available athttp://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-
04/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb 917_bill_20030221_introduced.pdf (amends section 309
of California's Corporate Code, requiring corporate directors to ensure that profits
do not come at the expense of the environment, human rights, public health and
safety, the welfare of communities, and employee dignity); Minnesota also tried to
enact a similar bill: Bill S.F. 1529, available at http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/
binlbldbill.php?bill=S1529.0&session=ls83. (Both bills have been tabled and are no
longer active as of 2004.).
156. Id
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"alternative models of corporate governance. '" '59 Hence, California
may be the pioneer in creating the first For-Benefit corporation.
Despite this window of opportunity in California, drafting a new
chapter to the California corporate code will take time and may be
subject to opposition from powerful interest groups that will lobby to
table the bill or kill it in the process.' Additionally, it is uncertain
whether courts will uphold legislation inherently contrary to case law
that offers large deference to the director in making business
decisions.
Assuming Hinkley's Amendment is enacted, the final
amendment may end up significantly different from the original
proposition due to the common compromises and filibusters as seen
in California's enactment of the Hinkley Amendment. 161 California's
amendment may even pose a threat to For-Benefit corporations
because of its vague and over inclusive terms.16 Many states have
proposed new "hybrid" forms including the Socially Responsible
Corporations ("SRCs") proposed in Hawaii and Minnesota in 2007,163
the Non-profit Limited Liability Company enacted in Tennessee and
Kentucky,"M and the Low-profit Limited Liability Company (L3C)
159. Id
160. Minnesota legislation has tabled the bill in the judiciary and no further action
has been taken to bring the amendment back to life.
161. In addition to the twenty-six word amendment, the California Assembly
inserted subsections (d) through (k) that indicate a director may be personally liable
for a violation of the Hinkley Amendment in addition to any person that is under his
control.
162. Section 309 subsection (d) through (i) asserts that an individual director may
be sued as well as anyone under his control unless the director can somehow prove
that he voted against such action or the decision was made prior to his entrance on
the board. Subsection () gives the attorney general broad discretion in determining
when a corporation has violated its duty to stakeholders and what appropriate
penalties will be imposed. Vague terms such as "human rights" or "employee
dignity" are spread throughout the amendment without any real clarification.
163. See Minnesota Responsible Business Corporation Act, ch. 304A, § 2(2), 84th
Legis. Sess. (Minn. 2006), available at http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/
bin/bldbill.php?bill=S3786.0.html&session=ls84; see also H.B. 3118, § 2, 23d Leg.
(Haw. 2006), available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sitel/archives/2006/
getstatus.asp?query-HB3118&showstatus-on&showtext=on&showcommrpt=on&cu
rrpage=; see also Billitteri, Mixing Mission and Business, supra note 57, at 14.
164. Enacted in Kentucky in 1994, revised in 2007 KRS §§275.025-275.540;
enacted in Tennesse in 2001, revised in 2004 Tenn. Code Ann. §48-101-801-809; see
generally James M. McCarten & Kevin N. Perkey, Tennessee Nonprofit LLCs -- A
New Option for Tax-Exempt Organizations, 3 Transactions 15 (2001). See also Larry
E. Ribstein, Reverse Limited Liability and the Design of Business Associations, 30
Del. J. Corp. L. 199, 212-13 (2005).
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proposed in North Carolina in 2007165 and enacted in Vermont in
2008.166 Although these propositions are a step in the right direction,
all fall short of a fully-realized For-Benefit corporation.
B. Europe s Adoption of Similar Socially Responsible Provisions
After much pressure from the Corporate Responsibility
Coalition, the United Kingdom enacted the Companies Act,167 similar
to the Hinkley Amendment. The Companies Act requires directors
to take into account how their business activities will affect
employees, communities and the environment.'9 Although this act is
a positive turn in the right direction, companies have received no
pragmatic guidance or help as to how exactly they should respond.
Moreover, corporations are left unsure as to whether they will be held
liable for a breach of their fiduciary duty to stakeholders in addition
to shareholders.
Similar encouragement for corporations to acknowledge
stakeholder interests is expressed in European Union. In March
2005, the European Council acknowledged that "in order to
encourage investment and provide an attractive setting for business
and work, the European Union must complete its internal market and
make its regulatory environment more business-friendly, while
165. See also B. 91, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2007), available at
http://www.ncleg.net/sessions/2007/Bills/Senate/PDF/S91v5.pdf; H.B. 39, 2007 Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2007), available at http://www.ncleg.net/sessions/
2007/bills/house/PDF/H39vl.pdf; see also Michael Gottesman, From Cobblestones to
Pavement" The Legal Road Forward for the Creation of Hybrid Social Organizations,
26 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 345, 353 (2007).
166. See H.B 0775 available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/database/status/
summary.cfm; see generally Billitteri, Miing Mission and Business, supra note 57 at
13-14.
167. Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006 states that: (1) A director of a
company must act in a way that he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in
doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to (a) the likely consequences of any
decision in the long term, (b) the interests of the company's employees, (c) the need
to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and others,
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of
business conduct, and (f) the need to act fairly between the members of the company.
Companies Act, 2006, c.46, § 172 (United Kingdom).
168. Id.; see also Marking the Moment" Implementation of The Companies Act,
http://www.corporate-responsibility.org/C2B/PressOffice/display.asp?ID=86&Type=
2 ; See also. Marking the Moment.- Implementation of The Companies Act,
http://www.corporate-responsibility.org/C2B/PressOffice/display.asp?ID=86 &Type =
2; see also, Keay, Tackling the Issue, supra note 120 at 591.
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business must in turn develop its sense of social responsibility."' 69 In
the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (2005-2008), the
Council urged Member States to "encourage enterprises in
developing their corporate social responsibility.' 70
Moreover, the European Parliament has passed resolutions to
encourage CSR businesses, notably in its resolutions of 2002171 and
2003.172 In a 2006 resolution, the European Commission recognized
that although the market based economy opens up new jobs and
business, it "also creates a corresponding need for self-limitation and
mobilisation on the part of the business community, in the interest of
social stability and the well-being of modern democratic societies. '
This resolution, inter alia, extends the responsibility of the board of
directors to encompass the duty of minimizing any harmful social and
environmental impact of companies' activities, seeks to improve
working conditions, encourages a multi-stakeholder approach to
governance, and aims to resolve issues of corporate transparency and
communication.'74 In addition, it requires corporations to create their
own CSR reports, bringing forward a proposal for social and
environmental reporting to be included with financial reporting
requirements. 7 ' A year later, the European Parliament reaffirmed
these guidelines, calling on the commission to implement a
mechanism by which victims, including third-country nationals, can
seek redress against European companies in the national courts of the
Member States.'76
Despite the resolution's enumeration of new alternatives for
stakeholder-based business decisions, European companies will not
be liable for breach of the resolution's provisions because the
resolution is not binding and cannot be enforced under the European
Court of Justice.1 77 Nevertheless, this resolution may be referred to in
the European Court of Justice as a way to explain a law or prove




173. See supra note 31, at 2.
174. Id at 12.
175. Id. at 11.
176. Corporate social responsibility: implementing the partnership for growth and
jobs INI (2006) 2133 (Mar. 13 2007).
177. See, e.g., http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/droit-communautaire/droit_
communautaire.htm#1.3.
20091
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
additional support for a corporation's decision to look to stakeholder
interest business decisions.
International Governmental Organization's ("IGOs") are also
following in step with the European Union and the U.K. in promoting
socially responsible companies. '  The overall support of CSR
companies worldwide should be an encouragement to directors of
For-Benefit corporations who intend to expand their business abroad
because they will effectively be equipped with many tools to support
decisions made in the interests of non-shareholders.
VI. Conclusion: Multinational Multi-Faceted Corporations
In a 1999 Environics International Millennium Poll, where more
than 25,000 citizens across six continents were interviewed, two out of
three citizens wanted companies to go beyond the historical role of
making a profit.179  The international community is ready for
companies to contribute to broader societal goals, and a new Fourth
Sector is emerging to fulfill these needs. The Fourth Sector
recognizes that corporations are multi-faceted, harboring an innate
desire to do good and do well. Environmentalist entrepreneur Paul
Hawken claims that this "For-Benefit Sector" will be the guiding light
as we shift into a "restorative economy;" an economy that will cure
the flaws of our current one.
Although the Fourth Sector is emerging in virtually every
country, the U.S. is far behind. The For-Benefit corporate model
offers a novel possibility for U.S. companies to enter into the Fourth
Sector. However, before the For-Benefit corporation can become a
178. United Nations Global Compact published a code of social conduct for large
businesses in 2000 which requires businesses to consider stakeholder interests such as
human rights, labor rights and environmental rights, available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/; see also the U.N.'s research program seeking to
promote research and policy discussions about CSR in developing countries,
available at http://www.unrisd.org/engindex/research/busrep.htm; see also ILO
Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social
Policy, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/tridecl/
index.htm; ILO database on Business and Social Initiatives, available at
http://oracle02.ilo.org:6060/vpi/vpisearch.first (database on Business and Social
Initiatives relating to social and labor conditions where corporations are located);
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ("MNEs"), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines/ (2000); see also, OECD Principles for
Corporate Governance, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/governance/
principles.htm (1999).
179. WHAT MATTERS MOST, supra note 20, at 47.
180. Clark, A New Kind of Company, supra note 51.
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recognized legal entity in every state, it is first necessary to
understand how existing law affects For-Benefit corporations and to
decide what characteristics a For-Benefit corporation should have.
Within the current legal framework, careful and deliberate
decisions made with the utmost devotion towards benefiting the
interests of the corporation's socially conscious values should not
violate the shareholder primacy doctrine. As Woodrow Wilson so
gracefully states: "You are not here merely to make a living. You are
here to enrich the world - and you impoverish yourself if you forget
the errand." Appropriately, For-Benefit corporations are breaking
out of the one-dimensional, profit-driven mold, pioneering the path
towards a new multi-dimensional and values-driven Fourth Sector.
This pioneering venture is both exciting and terrifying as directors are
left with more questions than answers. Will the judiciary discard
outdated, market-based application of corporate law? How will
social businesses use old constituency statutes for new purposes? Will
a new stakeholder primacy doctrine emerge within the Fourth
Sector? To remedy these daunting uncertainties, corporations should
demand proper revisions in state corporate statutes that support of
For-Benefit corporations. Eventually, the tax code will need to
recognize a For-Benefit corporation as a new legal entity that will
have the ability to apply for tax-exempt status in exchange for certain
other limitations. Indeed, the time is ripe for businesses to refuse
legal penalty for the simultaneous pursuit of monetary success and
positive social impact.
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